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I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the “Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that an individual cannot be prohibited from providing another 
with advice or encouragement to commit suicide.1 Specifically, it 
held that Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute,2 which prohibits an 
individual from advising, encouraging, or assisting another to 
commit suicide, violated the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution because the terms “advising” and “encouraging” were 
unconstitutionally overbroad.3 Yet, the court also held that the 
assisted-suicide statute was constitutional, in part, because the term 
“assisting” was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.4 The court stated that “speech alone may 
also enable a person to commit suicide” and remanded the 
proceeding to determine if William Francis Melchert-Dinkel’s 
speech assisted the victims in their suicides.5 This note addresses 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that speech alone can 
rise to the level of “assistance.”6 
This case note begins by providing a brief history of the First 
Amendment and constitutional restrictions on free speech.7 Next, it 
 
 1.  State v. Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel III), 844 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 
2014). 
 2.  MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012). 
 3.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 24. 
 4.  Id. at 23. 
 5.  Id. at 23, 25. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 7.  See infra Part II.A. 
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discusses the history of assisted-suicide restrictions.8 The note then 
turns to the facts of Melchert-Dinkel, as well as the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision, rationale, and outcome.9 Finally, this 
note argues that, although the court’s application of strict scrutiny 
was appropriate, an interpretation of assistance in Minnesota’s 
assisted-suicide statute that includes pure speech10 is 
unconstitutional.11 
II. HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
Over the past four hundred years, freedom of speech in the 
United States has evolved. Our conceptual understanding of free 
speech derived from England.12 In 1791, that concept was inscribed 
in the First Amendment.13 Since then, the United States Supreme 
Court has used myriad tests to interpret the text in the First 
Amendment.14 In particular, the Court classifies speech based on its 
social value15 and generally protects the message’s content and a 
speaker’s viewpoint under the First Amendment.16 Moreover, the 
Court also considers where the message is conveyed. Like any First 
Amendment analysis, the Court turns to the origins of free speech 
to determine if speech on the Internet should receive greater 
protection than radio or broadcast television.17 
A.  Origins of Free Speech in the United States 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”18 In particular, most speech—
 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  Throughout this note, the phrase “pure speech” is used to specify speech 
or expression absent any physical action by an individual. 
 11.  See infra Part V.B–C. 
 12.  Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in the 
United States, 76 FLA. B.J. 71, 71 (2002). 
 13.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14.  See generally Joshua D. Rosenberg & Joshua P. Davis, From Four Part Tests to 
First Principles: Putting Free Speech Jurisprudence into Perspective, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
833, 874–76 (2012) (discussing several doctrines and tests used to determine the 
validity of statutory restrictions against the freedom of speech). 
 15.  See infra Part II.A. 
 16.  16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 476 (2014). 
 17.  See infra Part II.B. 
 18.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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artistic, social, political, and other forms, both spoken and 
written—is afforded some level of protection.19 The United States 
Supreme Court justifies freedom of speech by suggesting that it 
creates a beneficial “market place of ideas.”20 Thus, free speech is 
considered a useful tool in the search for truth and knowledge.21 
Furthermore, the Court has held that free speech fosters effective 
participation in government.22 Under this view, generally referred 
to as the “instrumentalist theory,” restrictions on free speech are 
justified when society does not benefit from the restricted speech.23 
Alternatively, the so-called “individual autonomy theory” relies on 
the idea of basic human rights and dignity to justify free speech.24 
This theory generally argues for greater free speech protections, 
but supports restrictions on speech against “outright lies and 
 
 19.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart 
of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for 
himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and 
adherence.”); see also Thea E. Potanos, Dueling Values: The Clash of Cyber Suicide 
Speech and the First Amendment, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 679 (2012). 
 20.  United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J., 
concurring); see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (stating that the 
First Amendment’s role is to foster individual self-expression and provide “‘public 
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’” 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978))); Citizens 
Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 
(1981) (“The Court has long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a 
marketplace for the clash of different views and conflicting ideas.”); see also Stanley 
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 2, 2–3 (1984).  
 21.  Ingber, supra note 20, at 3. To review the first known discussion of a 
“marketplace of ideas,” see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas . . . accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
 22.  See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection 
given speech . . . was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”); Stromberg 
v. People of Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (discussing the usefulness of “free 
political discussion” in asserting the will of the people such that government may 
respond). 
 23.  Ingber, supra note 20, at 4–5. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech 
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 121 (1989) (analogizing instrumental views as 
consequential). 
 24.  See Bruce E.H. Johnson & Kyu Ho Youm, Commercial Speech and Free 
Expression: The United States and Europe Compared, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 159, 169 
(2009) (citing THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 4, 5 (1966)). See generally Greenawalt, supra note 23. 
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subliminal manipulation,” because they may endanger autonomous 
choice.25 
In practice, the instrumentalist and individual autonomy 
theories both support the concept that some speech may be 
restricted.26 Yet, the Court found the instrumentalist theory more 
compelling and held that speech of “slight social value” may fall 
into a category less protected by the First Amendment.27 
Many less-protected classifications of speech are relevant to 
assisted suicide, and each classification is afforded a low level of 
scrutiny.28 Alternatively, where a prohibition on speech restricts the 
content of a message, the Court applies a much higher level of 
scrutiny.29 
1. Less-Protected Classifications 
Since the instrumentalist theory’s adoption, the United States 
Supreme Court has determined that several classifications of 
speech are of “slight social value.”30 These less-protected 
classifications of speech include speech integral to criminal 
conduct,31 speech that incites imminent lawless action,32 and 
fraudulent speech.33 Historically, the Court has been forced to 
balance the freedom of speech against certain dangers inherent in 
speech associated with lawlessness.34 In the 1949 case of Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., the Court created a new, less-protected 
classification of speech for the purposes of the First Amendment—
speech integral to criminal conduct.35 
At issue in Giboney was an injunction that prohibited a local 
union from picketing to compel a distributor to sign an agreement 
 
 25.  Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 150–52 (“Of course, every government 
prohibition of action interferes with free choice, and therefore with the exercise of 
autonomy.”). 
 26.  See generally Ingber, supra note 20; Potanos, supra note 19. 
 27.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 28.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 29.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 30.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  
 31.  See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012); Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 32.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969). 
 33.  See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
 34.  Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 548–49 (1951) (reasoning that a 
state may protect itself from violent overthrow). 
 35.  336 U.S. at 498. 
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that would violate Missouri antitrust laws.36 On appeal, the local 
union argued that prohibiting their picketing violated the First 
Amendment.37 This was the United States Supreme Court’s first 
opportunity to address whether the First Amendment should 
protect speech integral to the violation of a criminal statute.38 
Ultimately, the Court held that the “constitutional freedom for 
speech [does not] extend [protection] to speech or writing used as 
an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”39 
Twenty years later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court 
established another classification of less-protected speech—
incitement.40 Speech constitutes incitement when it advocates 
“imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”41 In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted 
under a criminal syndicalism42 statute for advocating violence per 
the Klan’s missions and assembling “with a group formed to teach 
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.”43 Although the 
Court recognized this additional less-protected class of incitement 
speech, it nevertheless found the statute unconstitutionally 
overbroad.44 The Court held that incitement implies more 
provocation to action than mere advocacy, and because Ohio’s 
statute prohibited advocacy, in addition to incitement, it went too 
far.45 
Forty-three years later, in United States v. Alvarez, a new, less-
protected speech classification was created.46 Specifically, Alvarez 
held that the government may prohibit fraudulent speech when 
the speaker, by his or her speech, intends to “gain a material 
 
 36.  Id. at 491–92.  
 37.  Brief for Appellants at 12, Giboney, 336 U.S. 490 (No. 182), 1948 WL 
47306, at *17. 
 38.  Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498–501. 
 39.  Id. at 498. For historical background, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88 (1940) and Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940), which discuss the 
limitations of a state’s power to impair free speech. 
 40.  395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  The term “criminal syndicalism” is defined as “[a]ny doctrine that 
advocates or teaches the use of illegal methods to change industrial or political 
control.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1679 (10th ed. 2014).  
 43.  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–48 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(discussing the Ku Klux Klan leader’s hateful remarks made at a televised rally). 
 44.  Id. at 449. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
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advantage” or affect “other valuable considerations.”47 In this case, 
an individual fraudulently represented himself as a Congressional 
Medal of Honor recipient.48 The United States Supreme Court held 
that the Stolen Valor Act,49 which prohibited individuals from 
fraudulently representing themselves as recipients of military 
medals, was unconstitutional.50 The Court declared that fraudulent 
speech was another classification with less protection under the 
First Amendment.51 However, it reasoned that the Stolen Valor Act 
was unconstitutional because the state could “achieve its legitimate 
objectives in less restrictive ways.”52 
Generally, however, restrictions on any of these less-protected 
classifications—speech that is integral to criminal conduct, incites 
imminent lawless action, or is fraudulent—are found constitutional 
because they are subjected to less scrutiny than other types of 
speech.53 This includes content-based restrictions,54 which are 
discussed next. 
 
 47.  Id. at 2547–48. The United States Supreme Court does not define “other 
valuable considerations” in Alvarez, but in previous decisions, it found that false 
statements are offered less protection under the First Amendment when they are 
related to situations that discuss defamation or some other legally cognizable 
harm. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982) (“[F]alsehoods are not 
protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.”); 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976) (“Untruthful speech . . . has never been protected for its own sake.”). 
 48.  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542. 
 49.  18 U.S.C. § 704 (2005). 
 50.  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 51.  Id. at 2545. 
 52.  Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 53.  See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973) (holding that a 
statute’s restrictions were constitutional because obscene materials were not 
protected by the First Amendment). 
 54.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) 
(holding that a statute prohibiting speech based on its content was subject to strict 
scrutiny); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny 
where a statute prohibited certain types of speech); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and 
Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1348 (2006). See generally 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 827 (2014) (analyzing the level of scrutiny required for content-based 
restrictions). 
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2. Content-Based Restrictions 
Content-based restrictions prohibit a particular message, 
subject, or viewpoint conveyed within speech.55 The United States 
Supreme Court requires a high level of scrutiny for content-based 
restrictions because the Court acknowledges the potential risks of 
limiting a speaker’s message.56 Society has a vested interest in 
permitting a “market place of ideas.”57 Thus, without a high level of 
scrutiny for content-based restrictions, the government could 
prohibit “disfavored ideas or views from [entering] the marketplace 
[of ideas].”58 
When restricted speech does not fall into a less-protected 
classification, the Court has consistently held that the speech is 
afforded total protection under the First Amendment.59 
Consequently, a statute that restricts speech based on its content 
must pass a strict level of scrutiny to be deemed constitutional.60 To 
pass strict scrutiny, a compelling governmental interest must exist 
and the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve that compelling 
interest.61 A statute is narrowly tailored if a compelling interest is 
actually served and there are no less restrictive alternatives.62 For 
example, in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, the Court 
held that a statute denying adult access to telephone messages, 
indecent in nature, was unconstitutional because there was a less 
 
 55.  Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 
(1987); see also Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive Conduct: 
What in the World Do They Mean (and What Do They Mean to the United States Supreme 
Court)?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 551, 555 (2000) (describing content-based 
restrictions as restrictions on speech based on “substance or . . . subject matter”). 
 56.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (holding that 
content-based regulations are “presumptively invalid”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (reasoning 
that restrictions on content-based speech can “drive certain ideas or viewpoints 
from the marketplace”); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991) 
(acknowledging that content-based restrictions distort the marketplace of ideas). 
 57.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 58.  Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 158 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 59.  See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000) 
(“Laws designed or intended to suppress or restrict the expression of specific 
speakers contradict basic First Amendment principles.”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“Government action that stifles speech on 
account of its message . . . contravenes [the First Amendment].”). 
 60.  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992). 
 61.  Id. at 199. 
 62.  See, e.g., Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 804. 
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rights-restrictive alternative.63 Conversely, in State v. Crawley, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found that a statute criminalizing false 
reports of police misconduct was constitutional because there was 
no less restrictive means of achieving the compelling governmental 
interest.64 
B.  The Internet and the First Amendment 
Because an analysis on free speech restrictions depends on 
where the message is conveyed, and broadcast media falls under 
the protection of the First Amendment,65 a historical look at other 
forms of broadcast media is highly relevant. The validity of a 
restriction depends, in part, on the applicable platform—radio, 
broadcast television, or the Internet. 
The Internet is arguably “‘the most participatory marketplace 
of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has yet 
seen.’”66 In the United States Supreme Court’s first Internet-related 
First Amendment case, it analogized the Internet with other forms 
of broadcast media.67 Historically, restrictions on broadcast media 
were analyzed under an intermediate level of scrutiny.68 
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, a statute prohibiting 
“indecent and patently offensive communications” on the Internet 
was constitutionally challenged.69 Although the State asserted a 
compelling governmental interest, the Court found that less 
 
 63.  492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989). 
 64.  819 N.W.2d 94, 107 (Minn. 2012) (holding that the statute could be 
narrowly construed to reach only defamatory statements). 
 65.  See Regulation of Broadcast Speech, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 148, 148 (1978). 
 66.  Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1115, 1119 (2005) (quoting ACLU v. Reno (Reno I), 929 F. Supp. 824, 
881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)). 
 67.  Reno v. ACLU (Reno II), 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997); Potanos, supra note 
19, at 682. 
 68.  See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 758–59 (1978) 
(distinguishing broadcast radio from other forms of media by stating that the 
broadcast audience includes both willing adults and unsupervised children, and 
pointing out that broadcasting penetrates into the home, a place that should 
remain free from uninvited sights and sounds). For a summary of the intermediate 
scrutiny analysis, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand 
intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an 
important governmental objective.” (emphasis added)). 
 69.  Reno II, 521 U.S. at 849 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
9
Schoeberl: Constitutional Law: How Minnesota Unconstitutionally Broadened It
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
  
2015] STATE V. MELCHERT-DINKEL 407 
restrictive means to achieve the State’s interest were available.70 
Notably, in its analysis, the Court reasoned that cyberspace was 
distinguishable from broadcast media and held that strict scrutiny 
was appropriate for content-based speech restrictions on the 
Internet.71 Specifically, it held that cyberspace is not invasive; 
rather, individuals seek the content displayed on the Internet, as 
opposed to broadcast media, where viewers have little control over 
the content to which they are exposed.72 Moreover, the Court was 
concerned with the chilling effect this particular restriction would 
have on free speech.73 Consequently, the Court held that the 
statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it 
failed strict scrutiny.74 
In Reno, the statute’s chilling effect was measured against two 
other cases. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Court found a 
judicial rule unconstitutional under the void for vagueness doctrine 
because the rule failed to provide “fair notice to those to whom [it 
was] directed.”75 In Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Court held that the 
deterrent effect was increased when prohibited by a criminal 
statute.76 Reliance on these two cases, and the outcome in Reno, 
emphasize the Court’s desire to prevent the chilling effects 
associated with speech restrictions in cyberspace, even when such 
restrictions are aimed at limiting harmful speech.77 
 
 70.  Id. at 877 (citing Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 842) (agreeing with the district 
court that content-blocking software was “a reasonably effective” substitute and a 
less restrictive method of achieving the State’s compelling interest). 
 71.  Id. at 868 (arguing that factors present in other media discussions—
“scarcity of available frequencies” and “invasive nature”—are missing in the 
context of cyberpace (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637–38 
(1994) and Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989))). 
 72.  Id. at 869; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet 
as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2010) 
(discussing the various intermediaries employed to protect users from unwanted 
content, including firewalls and other filtering, anti-virus, and malware software).  
 73.  Reno II, 521 U.S. at 871–72 (holding that the vagueness of this statute 
created an “obvious chilling effect”).  
 74.  Id. at 846 (arguing that the suppression of “a large amount of speech” 
constitutes significant overbreadth of the challenged statute). 
 75.  501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 112 (1972)). 
 76.  380 U.S. 470, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 
Court’s “major premise” was “that criminal enforcement of an overly broad statute 
affecting rights of speech . . . is in itself a deterrent to the free exercise thereof”). 
 77.  Reno II, 521 U.S. at 846; see Todd A. Nist, Finding the Right Approach: A 
10
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III. HISTORY OF ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
MINNESOTA 
For over seven hundred years, Anglo-American law has 
consistently punished an individual for assisting another in 
committing suicide.78 Since the decriminalization of suicide, the 
United States Supreme Court has decided two significant cases 
questioning the constitutionality of barring assisted suicide.79 
In 1997, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court considered 
whether a statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide was 
constitutional under the Due Process Clause.80 The Court weighed 
history, tradition, and current practices as significant factors.81 
Ultimately, the Glucksberg Court held that assisting another in 
committing suicide was not a fundamental right; thus, it found the 
statute constitutional.82 
In the same year as the Glucksberg decision, the Court 
determined the constitutionality of another assisted-suicide statute 
in Vacco v. Quill.83 In this case, a group of physicians brought a 
lawsuit against the State of New York, arguing that a statute 
criminalizing the assistance of suicide was unconstitutional under 
the Equal Protection Clause.84 Although the physicians argued that 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment was no different than physician-
 
Constitutional Alternative for Shielding Kids from Harmful Materials Online, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 451, 461–67 (2004) (discussing the negative effects of allowing harmful speech 
on the Internet).  
 78.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997). 
 79.  Potanos, supra note 19, at 677. 
 80.  521 U.S. at 702.  
 81.  Id. at 710–19. Common law history shows that harsh penalties were 
imposed on the estate of individuals who committed suicide. Id. at 712–13. Later, 
the common law approach was abandoned as states enacted laws criminalizing one 
person for assisting another in committing suicide. Id. at 713–15. 
 82.  521 U.S. at 728. Some liberties are deemed fundamental because they are 
so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see also Ginsberg v. State of New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (concluding that a right was fundamental because it was 
“basic in the structure of our society”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (concluding that a right “as fundamental as our 
entire civilization” should maintain some protection, even if the U.S. Constitution 
does not expressly provide it). These fundamental rights are “protected by the 
Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution].” 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. 
 83.  521 U.S. 793 (1997).  
 84.  Id. at 797–98.  
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assisted suicide, the United States Supreme Court disagreed.85 The 
Vacco Court reasoned that a distinction exists between assisting 
another in committing suicide and letting another die through 
refusal of medical care—a distinction sufficient to confirm the 
constitutionality of the statute under the Equal Protection Clause.86 
While the Court, in distinguishing the two, focused on the actor’s 
intent, its reasoning also concluded that some action or inaction 
was required to violate the assisted-suicide statute.87 
IV. THE MELCHERT-DINKEL DECISION AND OUTCOME 
A.  Facts 
Two individuals, Mark Drybrough and Nadia Kajouji, 
committed suicide after communicating over the Internet with 
William Francis Melchert-Dinkel.88 In both cases, Melchert-Dinkel 
responded to the victims in an online forum and encouraged their 
suicidal thoughts.89 Additionally, he attempted to watch the victims 
commit suicide “via webcam.”90 The State charged Melchert-Dinkel 
with two counts of aiding suicide.91 He was convicted on both 
counts at trial,92 and the conviction was affirmed by the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals.93 
 
 85.  Id. at 798–99. 
 86.  Id. at 793–94 (reasoning that this distinction agrees with principles of 
causation and intent); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
279–80 (1990) (discussing the right to refuse lifesaving treatment). 
 87.  Vacco, 521 U.S. at 802 (noting that a physician assisting a patient to 
commit suicide and a physician letting a patient die may have the same result); 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 (defining euthanasia as the “deliberate termination of 
another’s life at his request”).  
 88.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014).  
 89.  Id. at 16–17. 
 90.  Id. at 16. 
 91.  Appellant’s Brief, Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13 (No. A11-0987), 2012 
WL 10756771, at *2.  
 92.  State v. Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel I), No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL 
893506, at *19 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011). 
 93.  State v. Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel II), 816 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).  
12
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1. Mark Drybrough 
On or around July 27, 2005, Mark Drybrough committed 
suicide by hanging.94 Melchert-Dinkel initially contacted Drybrough 
in an online forum after Drybrough posted a question about 
committing suicide by hanging without a high point to tie his 
rope.95 Melchert-Dinkel, posing as a female emergency room nurse, 
answered Drybrough’s post by e-mail, suggesting that he could 
hang himself using a doorknob.96 Additionally, Melchert-Dinkel 
assured Drybrough of this method’s effectiveness, falsely boasting 
that he “trialed it . . . with very good results” and that he also 
planned on hanging himself.97 Closing his initial e-mail, Melchert-
Dinkel pressed Drybrough to reply with any additional questions, 
promising that he would respond quickly.98 
In subsequent e-mails, Drybrough disclosed to Melchert-Dinkel 
that he suffered from mental-health issues and a condition with 
“chronic flu-like symptoms.”99 When Drybrough later inquired 
about committing suicide by overdosing on easily obtainable drugs, 
Melchert-Dinkel discouraged this method and again urged that 
Drybrough hang himself.100 Moreover, Melchert-Dinkel created a 
false sense of urgency in Drybrough’s suicide by stating, “I want to 
[die] very badly and plan to soon but [I] will stay here for you as 
long as possible.”101 
Throughout their communications, Drybrough indicated that 
he had “hope[d] that things might change.”102 He also told 
Melchert-Dinkel that he was grappling between life and suicide.103 
In Drybrough’s last e-mail, he told Melchert-Dinkel that he was not 
 
 94.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 17. 
 95.  Id. at 16.  
 96.  Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 706. Drybrough considered this 
information to be “instructions,” and he passed the explanation along to another 
inquirer. Id.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 707. 
 100.  Id. at 706. 
 101.  Respondent’s Brief at 34, Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) 
(No. A11-0987), 2012 WL 10756772, at *34. 
 102.  Id. at 7. 
 103.  Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 706–07.  
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suicidal.104 Yet, he followed Melchert-Dinkel’s advice; he hung a 
noose, put it around his neck, and killed himself.105 
2. Nadia Kajouji 
On March 1, 2008, Nadia Kajouji posted a message on a 
suicide website stating that she suffered from severe depression.106 
Her post asked for advice on quick and reliable suicide methods.107 
In Melchert-Dinkel’s first e-mail to Kajouji, he again falsely 
represented himself as a female emergency room nurse suffering 
from severe depression and expressed a desire to commit suicide 
soon.108 In the course of their first conversation, Melchert-Dinkel 
advocated for self-hanging and proposed that they commit suicide 
together.109 Kajouji declined and, instead, stated her desire to jump 
from a bridge because she wanted her suicide to look like an 
accident.110 In his second e-mail, Melchert-Dinkel repeatedly 
advised Kajouji to commit suicide by hanging and suggested that 
they both commit suicide that night.111 In their last online chat, 
Kajouji confidently claimed that she would commit suicide in a few 
hours.112 Her body was found in a river six weeks later.113 
After Kajouji’s death, law enforcement discovered her e-mails 
to Melchert-Dinkel.114 Concerned that Melchert-Dinkel was also 
 
 104.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 7. Four days after Drybrough’s 
final e-mail, Drybrough’s sister found him hanging from a loft ladder leaning up 
against a wall. Id. 
 105.  Melchert-Dinkel I, No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL 893506, at *9–10 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011). 
 106.  Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 708. 
 107.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 8; see also Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 
893506, at *11 (“I have lived with severe depression . . . and it only worsens as I 
seek treatment and help. I have not attempted suicide in the past. . . . I just want a 
quick out.”). 
 108.  Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 708. 
 109.  Id.; see also Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *11–16 (“[I]f you wanted 
to do hanging we could have done it together on line so it would not have been so 
scary for you. . . . I can help you with it with the [web] cam.”). 
 110.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 8. 
 111.  Id. at 10–11, 34 (“I wish [w]e [b]oth could die now while we are quietly 
in o[u]r homes ton[ight].”). 
 112.  Id. at 11; Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *16. Kajouji was never seen 
after she e-mailed her roommate to inform her that she was going skating—the 
same night as Kajouji’s final conversation with Melchert-Dinkel. Id. at *17. 
 113.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 2014). 
 114.  Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *17. 
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suicidal, the Faribault police traced his e-mail address and 
contacted the Mankato Police Department.115 At first, Melchert-
Dinkel blamed his daughters for the e-mails; however, he eventually 
admitted to sending the communications himself.116 Consequently, 
he was charged “with two counts of advising and encouraging 
suicide.”117 The prosecution did not accuse Melchert-Dinkel of 
assisting in the suicides, nor was “assist” included in the charges 
against him.118 
B.  Procedural Posture Before the Minnesota Supreme Court 
At a bench trial, the State presented evidence that Melchert-
Dinkel falsely posed as a female registered nurse and falsely 
discussed his own desire to commit suicide in his communications 
with the victims. The State showed that Melchert-Dinkel’s 
communications took the form of coaching—urging the victims to 
write with any questions, promising that he would reply quickly.119 
The State also introduced evidence that Melchert-Dinkel provided 
Drybrough with step-by-step instructions on how to commit suicide 
by hanging.120 The State’s evidence indicated that both victims 
believed that Melchert-Dinkel’s advice was both practical and 
sympathetic.121 
After closing arguments, the district court found Melchert-
Dinkel guilty of advising and encouraging suicide.122 Furthermore, 
the district court dismissed Melchert-Dinkel’s argument that the 
assisted-suicide statute was unconstitutional on its face because his 
speech was protected by the First Amendment.123 Melchert-Dinkel 
appealed the district court’s decision, maintaining that Minnesota’s 
assisted-suicide statute violated his First Amendment rights.124 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 844 
N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014). In addition, Melchert-Dinkel admitted to asking fifteen 
to twenty people to commit suicide and requesting a webcam to capture the event. 
Id. at 712. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id.; see also Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 893506, at *29. 
 119.  Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 705. 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 707–11. 
 122.  Id. at 712. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
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Today, aiding another in committing suicide remains a 
criminal offense in many states.125 However, some state statutes have 
moved away from prohibitions on “encouraging” or “advising” 
another to commit suicide.126 Prior to Melchert-Dinkel, the case that is 
the topic of this note, Minnesota prohibited “intentionally 
advis[ing], encourag[ing], or assist[ing] another in taking the 
other’s own life.”127 Currently, Minnesota prohibits an individual 
from intentionally assisting another in taking the other’s life.128 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently reviewed two cases—
Melchert-Dinkel included—addressing assisted suicide. In Melchert-
Dinkel, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Minnesota’s 
assisted-suicide statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad.129 
After the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of Melchert-
Dinkel,130 the Minnesota Court of Appeals had an opportunity to 
reconsider its decision in another assisted-suicide case, State v. Final 
Exit Network, Inc.131 Here, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed 
 
 125.  See generally Justine R. Young, Dead Wrong: The Problems with Assisted Suicide 
Statutes and Prosecutions, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 123 (1994) (comparing assisted-
suicide statutes in the twenty-nine states that had them). 
 126.  This author researched assisted-suicide statutes throughout the United 
States. Many statutes still include the terms “advise” and “encourage”; however, 
several states have modified their assisted-suicide statutes to indicate requirements 
of intent and causation in assisting another to commit suicide. See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. ANN. § 11.41.120 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.) (“A person 
commits . . . manslaughter . . . [when he or she] intentionally aids another person 
to commit suicide.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d 
Extraordinary Sess.) (“A person commits manslaughter . . . [when he or she] 
purposely causes or aids another person to commit suicide.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-54a (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (“A person is guilty of 
murder when . . . he causes . . . a suicide by force, duress, or deception.”); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d Tech. 
Sess. of the 118th Gen. Assemb.) (“A person who intentionally causes another 
human being, by force, duress, or deception, to commit suicide commits causing 
suicide. . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West, Westlaw through 2014 
Reg. Sess.) (“A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she 
knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.”). 
 127.  MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subdiv. 1 (2012), invalidated in part by Melchert-
Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014). 
 128.  See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 18. 
 129.  Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d at 705, 713–17, 720 (finding that the statute 
was narrowly tailored to serve the State’s compelling interest, even if Melchert-
Dinkel’s speech was protected by the First Amendment). 
 130.  See id.  
 131.  State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., Nos. A13-0563, -0564, -0565, 2013 WL 
16
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its previous decision, holding that the prohibition on encouraging 
or advising another to commit suicide was unconstitutional.132 
Unlike its previous decision in Melchert-Dinkel, the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals applied strict scrutiny and held that Minnesota’s 
assisted-suicide statute failed because the language was broad and 
there was no causal connection between the prohibition and the 
state’s interest in preserving human life.133 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court had its first opportunity to apply a First Amendment 
argument to Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute in Melchert-Dinkel. 
C.  The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Melchert-Dinkel again 
claimed that his interactions with Drybrough and Kajouji 
“represented constitutionally-protected speech pursuant to the 
First Amendment.”134 However, the State argued that Minnesota’s 
assisted-suicide statute could restrict Melchert-Dinkel’s speech 
because it fell into one of three less-protected exceptions to the 
First Amendment.135 Even if an exception did not apply, the State 
claimed that Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute was narrowly 
tailored to serve the State’s compelling governmental interest in 
preserving human life.136 
1. Majority Opinion 
The majority disagreed with the State’s argument that 
Melchert-Dinkel’s speech fell into the less-protected criminal 
conduct or incitement exceptions because the conduct 
advocated—suicide—did not violate any existing criminal statute.137 
Similarly, it disagreed with the State’s argument that the statute fell 
 
5418170 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2013), rev. granted, (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013), rev. 
denied, (Minn. June 17, 2014), stay vacated, (Minn. June 17, 2014). 
 132.  Id. at *7. 
 133.  Id. at *5–6. 
 134.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *2. 
 135.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 2014) (arguing that 
Melchert-Dinkel’s speech was integral to criminal conduct, likely produced 
imminent lawless action, and provided false statements amounting to fraud).  
 136.  Id. at 18. 
 137.  Id. at 19–21. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the argument 
regarding speech integral to criminal conduct was circular, and that an individual 
cannot be punished for inciting an action that is not illegal. Id. at 20.  
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under the less-protected fraud exception to the First 
Amendment.138 
Instead, the court held that a strict level of scrutiny was 
required because the restriction was content-based.139 First, the 
court recognized the State’s interest in preserving human life as 
compelling.140 Next, it reasoned that prohibiting the assistance, 
advisement, or encouragement of suicide could be necessary to 
achieve the State’s compelling governmental interest in preserving 
human life, per Glucksberg.141 Finally, it analyzed each term of the 
statute for its common and ordinary meaning to determine 
whether the statute was narrowly tailored.142 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statute’s 
restriction against assisting another to commit suicide was narrowly 
tailored because a direct, causal link could be drawn between the 
prohibition and the State’s interest in preserving human life. The 
court also found that speech alone may constitute assistance that 
enables a person to commit suicide.143 Additionally, the court held 
that the terms “advise” and “encourage” indicated no direct, causal 
connection to committing suicide.144 Consequently, those terms 
within the statute violated the First Amendment, and they were 
resultantly severed from Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute.145 
 
 138.  Id. at 21. While the Minnesota Supreme Court found Melchert-Dinkel’s 
actions to be deceitful, it was not convinced that his actions were an attempt at 
gaining some “material advantage or valuable consideration.” Id. 
 139.  Id. at 18 (“[T]he government ‘has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” (quoting Police 
Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).  
 140.  Id. at 22 (citing Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 
U.S. 476, 485 (1983)).  
 141.  Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997)) 
(reasoning that a statement made by the United States Supreme Court in 
Glucksberg, under a rational basis review, was sufficient to continue the Court’s 
analysis under strict scrutiny). 
 142.  Id. at 22–24. 
 143.  Id. at 23 (“While enablement perhaps most obviously occurs in the 
context of physical assistance, speech alone may also enable a person to commit suicide.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 144.  Id. at 23–24 (“[A] prohibition on advising or encouraging includes 
speech that is more tangential to the act of suicide.”); Id. at 24 (reasoning that the 
State’s compelling interest, preserving human life, did not mean that the State had 
a compelling interest to restrict speech that advised or encouraged suicide). 
 145.  Id. at 15–16. 
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2. Justice Page’s Dissent: Only Restricting Physical Actions that 
Assist Suicide 
Justice Page agreed with the majority’s holding that barring 
speech that “advises” or “encourages” suicide was 
unconstitutional.146 However, he disagreed with the court’s remand 
to determine whether Melchert-Dinkel’s speech assisted the victims 
in taking their lives.147 He argued that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that Melchert-Dinkel assisted the two suicides 
under the dictionary definition of “assist” because there was no 
physical action.148 Justice Page pointed out that the majority’s 
failure to use the “dictionary definition of the word ‘assist’ [wa]s 
telling.”149 Furthermore, he claimed that the State failed to charge 
Melchert-Dinkel with assisting suicide—the prosecution’s argument 
focused on whether Melchert-Dinkel advised or encouraged 
suicide.150 Finally, Justice Page pointed out that, when Melchert-
Dinkel was convicted, the district court judge intentionally left out 
the term “assist” from its finding.151 He argued that this omission 
was deliberate; thus, remanding the case to determine whether 
Melchert-Dinkel assisted in the suicides was not appropriate.152 
D.  Remand Proceedings Following the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
On September 8, 2014, Melchert-Dinkel appeared in Rice 
County District Court once more to determine whether his speech 
assisted Drybrough or Kajouji in their suicides; he was convicted of 
assisting Drybrough in committing suicide and attempting to assist 
Kajouji in committing suicide.153 Here, the district court defined 
“assist” as “speech or conduct that provides another person with 
what is needed . . . to commit suicide.”154 Additionally, the district 
 
 146.  Id. at 25 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 147.  Id. (arguing, among other things, that there was insufficient proof to 
demonstrate that Melchert-Dinkel assisted the victims in committing their 
suicides). 
 148.  Id. at 26. Justice Page, using the same dictionary as the majority, 
emphasized that the definition of “assist” requires some act. Id.  
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 26–27. 
 151.  Id. at 25. 
 152.  Id. at 27–28. 
 153.  State of Minnesota v. William Francis Melchert-Dinkel (Melchert-Dinkel 
IV), 66-CR-10-1193, Sept. 8, 2014, at *1–2. 
 154.  Id. at *9. 
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court focused on whether a “direct and causal connection” existed, 
and whether Melchert-Dinkel “intended to provide instructive 
suicide methods.”155 
To convict Melchert-Dinkel of assisting Drybrough in 
committing suicide, the district court focused on several e-mails 
where he stated his desire to “help” Drybrough commit suicide.156 
Moreover, it reasoned that Melchert-Dinkel’s e-mails were “step-by-
step instructions” that Drybrough sought, and Drybrough followed 
these instructions when he committed suicide.157 
Although Kajouji also committed suicide, the court reasoned 
that Melchert-Dinkel did not assist in her suicide because she used 
a method different from Melchert-Dinkel’s instructions.158 
Nonetheless, the district court held that Melchert-Dinkel 
committed the lesser offense of attempting to assist suicide because 
he intended to assist in her suicide, and he “did an act that was a 
substantial step toward . . . assisting suicide.”159 
Melchert-Dinkel will likely appeal these convictions, arguing 
that he did not assist in Drybrough’s suicide.160 Moreover, his 
attorney stated that a different defense would have been used 
under the new assisted-suicide statute.161 
V. ANALYSIS 
This note agrees with, and expands on, Justice Page’s dissent. 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to apply a strict 
level of scrutiny in this case was correct, it mistakenly concluded 
that Melchert-Dinkel could assist in the victims’ suicide through 
 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at *6–7. 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Id. at *10. 
 159.  Id. at *11–12 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.17 (2012)). 
 160.  Importantly, Melchert-Dinkel instructed Drybrough on how he could 
hang himself from a door knob. Melchert-Dinkel I, No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL 
893506, at *5–6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011). Since significant weight was 
placed on Melchert-Dinkel’s specific instructions, and Drybrough did not commit 
suicide in the manner instructed by Melchert-Dinkel, a direct, causal relationship 
may not exist. See Melchert-Dinkel IV, 66-CR-10-1193, at *5; Melchert-Dinkel I, 2011 WL 
893506, at *10.  
 161.  Former Nurse Guilty of Assisting Suicide to be Sentenced, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 16, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/15/former    
-nurse-assisted-sui_n_5988730.html. 
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speech alone.162 Additionally, this note analyzes whether the court 
properly balanced the competing interests at issue. 
A.  Less-Protected Classifications of Internet Speech: Harmful or Illegal 
Conduct? 
Although less-protected classifications of speech have been 
established, the United States Supreme Court maintains a 
protective stance over the First Amendment.163 Due to the delicate 
nature of expressive conduct on the Internet,164 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand on the exceptions to 
protected speech in Giboney and Brandenburg was appropriate.165 
1.  The Giboney Exception: Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct 
Correct application of the holding in Giboney requires a 
distinction between harmful conduct and illegal conduct.166 In 
Giboney, the Court concluded that speech can be restricted when it 
constitutes “a single and integrated course of [illegal] conduct.”167 
The Court’s reasoning focused on the appellant’s violation of a 
statute, not on any specific harmful action.168 Similarly, in New York 
v. Ferber, the Court held that the sale of child pornography was “an 
integral part of the [illegal] production of such materials.”169 
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has used a 
balancing test to determine whether a First Amendment restriction 
 
 162.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 25 (Minn. 2014). 
 163.  See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (“[A]uthors 
of the First Amendment knew that . . . unconventional ideas might disturb the 
complacent, but they . . . believed [it] essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever 
to triumph over slothful ignorance.”). 
 164.  See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, First Amendment Protection 
Afforded to Web Site Operators, 30 A.L.R. 6th 299 (2008) (summarizing First 
Amendment protections on the Internet). 
 165.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 19–20. 
 166.  Id. at 20 (arguing that the inclusion of harmful speech in the phrase 
“speech integral to criminal conduct” expands the exception beyond the United 
States Supreme Court’s guidance). 
 167.  Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). Although the majority 
considered the direct harm suffered by the child, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the promotion of such performances was “intrinsically related to 
. . . sexual abuse of children.” Id.  
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is justified.170 Restricting speech that is integral to illegal conduct is 
clearly justified by a State’s compelling governmental interest in 
preventing criminal activity.171 Yet, expanding a category of speech 
to harmful conduct may unreasonably broaden the category.172 For 
example, some harm may arise out of actions independent of any 
intended message.173 Furthermore, some harmful speech may be 
justifiably protected by the First Amendment.174 
The situation becomes more complex when dealing with 
harmful speech on the Internet. The Internet permits individuals 
to remain anonymous when stating their opinions and ideas, 
however distasteful or harmful the speech may be to others.175 
Accordingly, speech is likely to be more harmful on the Internet, 
since individuals are not held accountable for their anonymous 
conduct.176 Moreover, restricting harmful speech in this context 
may have a significant chilling effect, and the United States 
Supreme Court has consistently held statutes unconstitutional “to 
avoid any chilling effect caused by an improper interpretation.”177 
The Internet consists of an infinite number of mediums 
through which individuals can communicate.178 Since the Internet 
is a popular forum in which to exchange ideas, the Minnesota 
 
 170.  Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 779 
(2001). 
 171.  Id.; see also Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498. 
 172.  See Matthew C. Ruedy, Repercussions of A Myspace Teen Suicide: Should Anti-
Cyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 343 (2008) (arguing that an 
individual may be harmed even though, under an objective standard, a reasonable 
person would not foresee any harm). 
 173.  See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *43–44 (arguing that 
Melchert-Dinkel’s actions were independent of the victims’ decisions to commit 
suicide); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 170, at 777. 
 174.  See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215–17 (3d Cir. 
2001) (holding that a restriction against any “unwelcome verbal, written or 
physical conduct which offends . . . an individual” is unconstitutional, even though 
the state asserted a harm caused by the speech). 
 175.  See Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech 
and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 238–39 (2008). 
 176.  Id. at 239. 
 177.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 311 (2010); see 
also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973); 281 Care Comm. v. 
Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 629 (8th Cir. 2011). See generally Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech 
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First 
Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010) (discussing the chilling effects 
doctrine recognized by the United States Supreme Court). 
 178.  See Reno II, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
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Supreme Court correctly held that the Giboney exception should 
not be expanded to include harmful speech. 
2. The Brandenburg Test: Speech that Incites Imminent 
Lawlessness 
In Melchert-Dinkel, the State attempted to draw the court’s 
attention to the interpretation of “imminent.”179 It correctly held 
that the Brandenburg exception only applied to unlawful actions.180 
Similar to Giboney, it is clear that the court was not willing to 
expand the Brandenburg exception to include both illegal and 
harmful speech.181 Instead, it maintained that the application of 
Brandenburg must be rigorously adhered to in the interest of 
protecting the First Amendment.182 
B.  Is There a Compelling Interest to Prohibit Legal Acts? 
To pass strict scrutiny, the government must first assert an 
interest that the court finds compelling.183 In Melchert-Dinkel, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found, based on precedent, that the 
State’s asserted interest in preserving human life was compelling.184 
Yet, public policy and opinion on assisted suicide may be 
changing.185 Moreover, the government should not prohibit an 
individual from assisting in a legal act. 
Compelling governmental interests have no textual support in 
the U.S. Constitution.186 Consequently, the United States Supreme 
Court has found compelling governmental interests on the basis of 
several different considerations.187 Specifically, governmental 
interests may be held compelling based upon public policy or “the 
 
 179.  See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 33–37. 
 180.  See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 20–21 (Minn. 2014) (citing 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
 181.  Id. at 19–21.  
 182.  See id. at 20–21. 
 183.  See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). 
 184.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 22 n.4. 
 185.  See Dennis Thompson, Did Brittany Maynard Change Minds About Right-to-
Die Laws?, CBSNEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com 
/news/brittany-maynard-poll-right-to-die-laws; see also infra notes 191–95 and 
accompanying text.  
 186.  Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 919 (1988).  
 187.  See id. 
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realization of constitutional guarantees.”188 In Melchert-Dinkel, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court relied on public health and policy 
concerns addressed in an amicus brief that was filed by the 
National Alliance on Mental Illness of Minnesota.189 
Although public policy arguments have historically favored 
rules that restrict an individual from assisting another in 
committing suicide,190 recent events may be changing this view.191 In 
fact, several other states have altered their assisted-suicide statutes 
to permit physician-assisted suicides.192 Polls have shown general 
approval for physician-aided end-of-life decisions.193 Yet, when the 
term “suicide” is used, the general approval rating drops.194 This 
suggests that the term “suicide” itself still carries a negative 
connotation.195 If general approval of assisted suicide continues, 
courts may be forced to reassess whether a compelling 
governmental interest exists based on public policy. Melchert-Dinkel 
holds that the government’s interest in prohibiting a legal act—
suicide—is compelling.196 Yet, courts should not prohibit actions 
that assist in what is legal. 
While a compelling governmental interest was found in 
Melchert-Dinkel, public policy seems to be changing,197 and 
 
 188.  Id. at 935–37. 
 189.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 22 n.4. 
 190.  See Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d 703, 713–14 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), 
rev’d, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
711–12 (1997)). 
 191.  See generally Cyndi Bollman, A Dignified Death? Don't Forget About the 
Physically Disabled and Those Not Terminally Ill: An Analysis of Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Laws, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 395 (2010); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 600 (2000). 
 192.  See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5292 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen. 
Assemb.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.010–.904 (West, Westlaw through 2014 
legislation); Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Mont. 2009). 
 193.  Lydia Saad, U.S. Support for Euthanasia Hinges on How It’s Described, 
GALLUP POL. (May 29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162815/support                  
-euthanasia-hinges-described.aspx.  
 194.  Id. (stating that the approval number is still above average when the term 
“suicide” is used). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 22 (Minn. 2014). 
 197.  Strong Public Support for Right to Die, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS 
(Jan. 5, 2006), http://www.people-press.org/2006/01/05/strong-public-support    
-for-right-to-die/ (“A solid majority of Americans (60%) believe a person has a 
moral right to end their life if they are suffering great pain and have no hope of 
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preserving human life in the face of suicide may no longer be a 
compelling interest. Moreover, no legislature should be allowed to 
prohibit the assistance of legal acts. 
C.  Melchert-Dinkel’s Outcome: Unconstitutional Restriction on Speech 
in Minnesota’s Assisted-Suicide Statute 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that assisting another in 
committing suicide can be prohibited because the term “assist” 
indicates a “direct, causal link” between the suicidal person and the 
person assisting in the suicide.198 The prohibition against assisted 
suicide is constitutional because the court found that the statute 
was narrowly tailored.199 This conclusion was proper, until the court 
stated that pure speech may assist another in committing suicide.200 
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute does not define the term 
“assist,”201 and the plain-meaning interpretation adopted by the 
court is inappropriate because assistance requires some physical 
action.202 Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute is analogous to its 
aiding and abetting statute, which requires some type of action 
beyond pure speech.203 By expanding the definition of “assist” to 
include pure speech, the Minnesota Supreme Court broadened the 
statute’s reach, thereby chilling speech that may also be properly 
defined as mere encouragement or advice. Whereas Melchert-
Dinkel’s speech—encouraging and advising suicide—is 
constitutionally protected, it may still be restricted under the 
majority’s overly broad definition of the term “assist.” 
1. Pure Speech and the Term “Assist” 
In his dissent, Justice Page asserts that some action, other than 
speech, must be performed for an individual to truly assist another 
in committing suicide.204 This assertion not only matches the 
 
improvement.”). 
 198.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23 (“[S]tatutory limitation that . . . must 
be targeted at a specific individual, narrows the reach to . . . direct, causal links.”). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 25–26 (Page, J., dissenting).  
 201.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012). 
 202.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26. 
 203.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.05, 609.215. 
 204.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26. 
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dictionary definition of “assist,”205 but it also ensures that the statute 
is narrowly tailored.206 
In addition, Justice Page’s assertion furthers Minnesota’s 
principles of statutory interpretation.207 In Melchert-Dinkel, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court defined the term “assist” as “provid[ing] 
(a person, etc.) with what is needed for a purpose.”208 However, this 
definition stems from the verb “help,” not “assist.”209 The court 
seemingly decided that the terms “assist” and “help” were 
synonymous, even though the text of the statute does not mention 
the word “help.”210 Moreover, the court further altered the 
definition of the term “assist” to include pure speech that 
“enable[s] a person to commit suicide.”211 The same dictionary 
used by the majority defines “assist” as the “act of helping.”212 This 
common definition of the term “assist” requires action beyond 
speaking; therefore, precluding pure speech contradicts the true 
definition of “assist.”213 
Relying on the majority’s definition not only defies the 
dictionary definition of “assist,” but it also contradicts statutory 
interpretation.214 The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
held that a statute “should be construed [such that] . . . no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous.”215 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
has similarly established that statutes must be “construed . . . so that 
no word . . . is superfluous, void, or insignificant.”216 
 
 205.  Id. (stating that “assist” is defined as the “act of helping” (quoting THE 
NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 132 (4th ed. 1993))).  
 206.  See infra Part V.C.3. 
 207.  See Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999); State v. Suess, 
236 Minn. 174, 182, 52 N.W.2d 409, 415 (1952). 
 208.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23 (majority opinion). Importantly, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s definition of the term “assist” was limited to the 
context of Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute. Id. 
 209.  Id. Justice Page points out that the majority’s “avoidance of the dictionary 
definition of the word ‘assist’ is telling.” Id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting).  
 210.  Id. at 26. 
 211.  Id. at 23 (majority opinion). 
 212.  Id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 304 (2009); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 
U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (6th ed. 2000)). 
 216.  Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999). 
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Under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s definition, “assist” is 
superfluous217 because it is given the same meaning as the terms 
“encourage” or “advise.”218 In Melchert-Dinkel, the court stated that 
the terms “advise,” “encourage,” and “assist” all fell under its broad 
definition for “aid,” a term the court uses interchangeably with 
“assist.”219 If the court had included an action more concrete than 
pure speech in its definition of “assist,” the term would not be 
superfluous. By omitting an action requirement from its definition, 
a defendant’s words alone could assist another to commit suicide.220 
Melchert-Dinkel’s instructions “encouraged” and “advised” others 
to commit suicide.221 That his words may also “assist” suicide 
supports the argument that the term “assist” is superfluous under 
the majority’s definition. 
2. California’s Solution: Comparing Assisted Suicide to Aiding and 
Abetting 
The California Supreme Court has interpreted its assisted-
suicide statute as prohibiting the “aiding and abetting of a specific 
suicidal act.”222 In particular, it has envisioned some level of 
physical participation by an individual that enables another to 
commit suicide.223 The court has interpreted the statute224 in this 
way because the assisted suicide language bears a close resemblance 
to the aiding and abetting language found elsewhere in California’s 
penal code.225 In addition, the terms “aiding” and “abetting” have 
 
 217.  Id. Under principles of statutory construction, a term is superfluous or 
insignificant if it is unnecessary or redundant. Id. (arguing that a redundant 
phrase in the language of a statute would be superfluous). 
 218.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23 (majority opinion) (defining the 
verb “advise” as to inform and the verb “encourage” as to give courage, 
confidence, or hope) (citation omitted). 
 219.  Id. at 25 n.7. 
 220.  Id. at 25 (concluding that Melchert-Dinkel’s speech could have assisted 
Drybrough and Kajouji in committing suicide). 
 221.  See Melchert-Dinkel II, 816 N.W.2d 703, 706, 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 222.  McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 223.  People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 511 (Cal. 1959) (holding that a person 
who “furnish[es] the means for bringing about death . . . for the use of the [other] 
person who himself commits . . . self murder” may be convicted of assisting 
suicide).  
 224.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 225.  In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 632 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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been used interchangeably with the terms in its assisted-suicide 
statute.226 
An analogy can be drawn between California’s and 
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide and aiding and abetting statutes, 
because each state’s respective statute closely resembles the 
other.227 Minnesota’s aiding and abetting statute reads, “A person is 
criminally liable for a crime . . . if the person intentionally aids [or] 
advises . . . the other to commit the crime.”228 Although this 
language is strikingly similar to the Minnesota’s assisted-suicide 
statute, the supreme court has interpreted each statute’s text very 
differently.229 While the statutes’ terms “aid” and “assist” differ, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court previously stated that “aid” is a term 
“broad enough to encompass advice, encourage[ment], and 
assist[ance].”230 If the supreme court interpreted its assisted-suicide 
statute as aiding and abetting a suicidal act, it too would require 
some physical action or further participation on the part of a 
defendant.231 In aiding and abetting cases, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court requires that the “defendant intended his presence or actions 
to further [the] commission of [a] crime.”232 Thus, while 
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide and aiding and abetting statutes are 
nearly identical in language, the court has given their terms 
significantly different meanings. 
Like California, the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt 
the previously established meaning of Minnesota’s aiding and 
 
 226.  Id. at 632 n.5 (discussing the similarities between statutes utilizing the 
terms advised, encouraged, aiding, and abetting). 
 227.  Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (“All persons concerned in the 
commission of a crime, whether . . . they . . . aid and abet in its commission, or, 
not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission . . . .”), and id. 
§ 401 (“Every person who deliberately aids, advises, or encourages . . . .”), with 
MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012) (“Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or 
assists . . . may be sentenced . . . .”), and id. § 609.05 (1991) (“A person is 
criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, 
advises . . . the other to commit the crime.”). 
 228.  MINN. STAT. § 609.05, subdiv. 1. 
 229.  See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014) (including pure 
speech within its definition of the term “assist”); State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 
805 (Minn. 2012) (defining the term “aid,” in part, as a defendant’s “presence or 
actions to further the commission of [a] crime” (citing State v. Mahkuk, 736 
N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007))).  
 230.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25 n.7. 
 231.  See Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 789. 
 232.  Id. at 805 (emphasis added) (citing Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 682). 
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abetting statute because the language is strikingly similar to 
Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute.233 If the Minnesota Supreme 
Court interpreted assisted suicide similarly to California, assisted 
suicide would require something more than pure speech. 
3. Distinguishing Between the Terms “Assist,” “Advise,” and 
“Encourage” 
The Minnesota Supreme Court sent mixed signals with its 
holding in Melchert-Dinkel. Clearly, the terms “encourage” and 
“advise” were unconstitutionally overbroad.234 Even though the 
court limited the assisted-suicide statute’s prohibition to “assist,” 
including pure speech within its definition unconstitutionally 
broadened the statute’s reach.235 Moreover, the term “assist” 
becomes arguably indistinguishable from the terms “encourage” 
and “advise” when its definition includes pure speech. 
Justice Page asserted that without some action “more concrete 
than speech instructing another on suicide methods,” publication 
of books that describe “successful suicide behavior” could be 
restricted.236 The majority justified its inclusion of pure speech by 
stating that a “direct, causal link between speech and the suicide” 
existed.237 Yet, Justice Page’s book example also suggests a direct, 
causal link to suicide. The book may not target a specific individual, 
but it targets a vulnerable group of people contemplating suicide. 
Here, a direct, causal link would exist if an individual committed 
suicide using information obtained from a book that outlined 
methods of committing suicide. 
The majority also reasoned that, unlike the term “assist,” 
nothing in the definitions for the terms “advise” or “encourage”238 
required “a direct, causal connection to a suicide.”239 Yet, each term 
may directly cause suicide. For example, in 1992, a television 
 
 233.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.05 (1991). 
 234.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 235.  A statute is unconstitutionally broad when it “deters the exercise of First 
Amendment rights by unnecessarily punishing constitutionally protected along 
with unprotected activity.” In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. 1978); see also 
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 
U.S. 611, 614 (1971). 
 236.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26.  
 237.  Id. at 23 (majority opinion). 
 238.  See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 239.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23.  
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station aired a movie that was based on a true story of a person who 
“aided her mother in committing suicide” with advice from a 
physician and a book that outlined suicide methods.240 Under the 
majority’s definition of “assist,” the physician, the person who aided 
her mother, and the author who outlined suicide methods could 
be charged under the assisted-suicide statute because pure 
speech—whether it encourages, advises, or assists—can enable an 
individual to commit suicide.241 Indeed, even the television 
company could be charged with assisting another in committing 
suicide if someone committed suicide after watching the movie. 
The majority’s interpretation of “assist” should include some 
action beyond pure speech.242 Alternatively, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court should interpret Minnesota’s assisted-suicide 
statute as aiding and abetting suicide.243 Regardless, the terms 
“encourage,” “advise,” and “assist” are indistinguishable when the 
definition of “assist” includes pure speech.244 An interpretation of 
“assist” that includes pure speech unconstitutionally broadens the 
language of the assisted-suicide statute in a First Amendment 
context.245 
D.  Melchert-Dinkel’s Impact and an Alternative Holding 
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not apply the less-
protected exceptions to the First Amendment found in Giboney, 
Brandenburg, and Alvarez in Melchert-Dinkel.246 Furthermore, it is clear 
that the court was unwilling to expand less-protected classifications 
of speech to include harmful speech.247 In the context of assisted 
suicide, the court determined that some speech may still be subject 
to restrictions further limiting First Amendment protections.248 Yet, 
the decision in Melchert-Dinkel severed the terms “advises” and 
“encourages” from Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute.249 
 
 240.  Young, supra note 125, at 124 n.7.  
 241.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 23. 
 242.  Id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 243.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *35–37. 
 244.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26. 
 245.  See id. 
 246.  See id. at 19–21 (majority opinion). 
 247.  Id.  
 248.  See id. at 23. 
 249.  Id. at 24. 
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The Melchert-Dinkel decision leads to several unanswered 
questions. What constitutes providing another with what is needed 
to commit suicide?250 Does giving another person step-by-step 
instructions on committing suicide by hanging constitute 
assistance?251 Is the statute really narrowly tailored such that it 
satisfies strict scrutiny? Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court did not elaborate on its classification of assisted-suicide 
speech, other than suggesting that Melchert-Dinkel’s speech could 
constitute assistance.252 
Courts cannot change or alter the text of a statute. However, 
the legislature may and should look to assisted-suicide statutes in 
other states as examples. Many states require action beyond pure 
speech in their assisted-suicide statutes, explicitly providing that 
some physical act is also required.253 By stating that assisted suicide 
requires a physical act, courts remove the need to apply strict 
scrutiny because a fundamental right—speech—is not affected. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have followed the 
reasoning in Justice Page’s dissent. Specifically, the holding should 
not have included pure speech in its definition of the term “assist,” 
and the terms “encourage” and “advise” should have been 
severed.254 This alternative ensures that the assisted-suicide statute is 
narrowly tailored to effect the compelling governmental interest of 
preserving human life.255 Moreover, requiring something more 
 
 250.  See id. at 23 (“Consistent with the plain language of the statute, we 
therefore conclude that the ‘assist[]’ prohibition . . . proscribes speech or conduct 
that provides another person with what is needed for the person to commit 
suicide.”).  
 251.  See Melchert-Dinkel I, No. 66-CR-10-1193, 2011 WL 893506, at *6 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011) (detailing e-mails in which Melchert-Dinkel wrote to 
Drybrough and explained in great detail how to commit suicide via suspension 
hanging). For a discussion on the Rice County District Court’s conclusion, see 
supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text. 
 252.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25. 
 253.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. 
Sess. and 2d Spec. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (West, Westlaw through 2014 
Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4017 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. 
Sess.); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-34.5 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.2 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5407 (West, Westlaw 
through 2014 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (West, Westlaw through 
2014 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102 (West, Westlaw through 2014 
Reg. Sess.). 
 254.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25–26 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 255.  See id. at 26. 
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than pure speech eliminates any concern over the chilling effect 
associated with speech that may assist another in committing 
suicide. Finally, the assisted-suicide statute should not be 
interpreted such that any term is superfluous.256 Since Melchert-
Dinkel did not perform any action beyond pure speech in the 
furtherance of the victims’ suicides, his conviction under the 
assisted-suicide statute should have been reversed and the charges 
vacated.257 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held that the 
standard of review for this First Amendment issue was strict 
scrutiny. The court’s refusal to apply any of the less-protected 
exceptions to Melchert-Dinkel’s speech implies that the First 
Amendment continues to protect harmful speech.258 While the 
court found the State’s interest in preserving human life 
compelling, such an interest may not be compelling in the context 
of assisted suicide. In addition, the court restricted pure speech 
that assists another in committing suicide.259 
Presented with a difficult question, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court determined that an individual could not be criminally 
charged for encouraging or advising another to commit suicide.260 
However, it upheld the restriction against assisting another in 
committing suicide.261 Moreover, the court found a restriction 
against pure speech that may assist another in committing suicide 
constitutional.262 The court’s reliance on a direct, causal link 
inherent in the term “assist,” not present in either the term 
“encourage” or “advise,” led to its conclusion that the restriction 
was narrowly tailored.263 However, including pure speech in its 
definition of the term “assist” unconstitutionally broadened the 
assisted-suicide statute.264 
 
 256.  See Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999). 
 257.  Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 25. 
 258.  See id. at 20–21 (majority opinion). 
 259.  Id. at 23. 
 260.  Id. at 24. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. at 23. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  See id. at 26 (Page, J., dissenting). 
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Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have required 
some action more concrete than speech alone to define the term 
“assist.”265 In doing so, it would have met the dictionary definition 
of “assist.”266 Furthermore, requiring physical action would have 
aligned the court’s interpretation of Minnesota’s assisted-suicide 
statute with its aiding and abetting statute,267 while also ensuring 
that the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad.268 Allowing a 
restriction on speech that assists another in committing suicide 
leaves the door open for further misinterpretations of, and 
unconstitutional restrictions on, the First Amendment freedom of 
speech. 
 
 265.  Id. at 25–26. 
 266.  Id. at 26. 
 267.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 91, at *14, 44. 
 268.  See Melchert-Dinkel III, 844 N.W.2d at 26. 
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